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CERCLA'S NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
PROVISIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE AND INNOVATIVE
APPROACH TO PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT
In 1980 Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) to establish federal authority
for abating and controlling the serious threat to human health and the
environment from improper hazardous waste disposal practices.' CERCLA

1. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, §§ 1-308, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(providing for liability, compensation, cleanup, and emergency
response for hazardous substances released into environment and cleanup of inactive hazardous waste disposal sites). Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) as a last-minute compromise between competing
House and Senate bills. See H.R. 7020, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 9437-78
(1980)(proposed amendment to Solid Waste Disposal Act); S. 1480, 96th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1979), 126 CONG. REc. 14938-48 (1980)(proposed Environmental Emergency Response Act);
see also United States v. Motollo, 605 F. Supp. 898, 905 (D.N.H. 1985)(noting that Congress
enacted CERCLA as compromise legislation after limited debate and under suspension of
rules). As a last-minute legislative compromise, CERCLA lacks direct legislative history. See
Motollo, 605 F. Supp. at 905 (noting that CERCLA lacks direct legislative history). The
committee reports that accompanied the competing House and Senate bills, however, indicate
that both houses of Congress intended to enact legislation that remedied the inability of
existing federal law to address the threat that releases of hazardous chemical wastes pose
to human health and the environment. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11
(1980)(noting absence of federal law establishing liability for releases of hazardous substances
into environment); H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 18, reprinted in 1980 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6120 (noting that existing law clearly cannot deal with
massive problem of hazardous waste disposal practices).
In enacting CERCLA, the House of Representatives and the Senate expressed concern
over the magnitude of human health and environmental problems associated with releases
of hazardous chemicals. See S. RP. No. 848, supra, at 2-10 (detailing problems associated
with releases of hazardous substances into environment); H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra, at 1922 (describing problems resulting from improper hazardous waste disposal practices). For
example, the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works noted that more than
90% of the hazardous waste produced in the United States is disposed of in unsound
manners, including haphazard land disposal, improper storage of dangerous substances, and
illicit dumping. S. REP. No. 848, supra, at 3-4. Moreover, the Senate committee reported
that unsound hazardous waste disposal practices have damaged human health by causing
cancer and aborted pregnancies, have contaminated groundwater, and have damaged natural
habitats. Id. at 4. Similarly, in reporting on H.R. 7020, the House Committee on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce noted that, in 1979, over 30,000 inactive and uncontrolled hazardous
waste sites existed in the United States. H.R. RaP. No. 1016, supra, at 18. The House
Committee additionally noted that many of these hazardous waste sites contained large
quantities of chemical wastes, involved unsafe designs and disposal methods, and posed
substantial threats to human health and the environment. Id. at 18-20.
In addition to detailing the nature and magnitude of problems associated with unsound
hazardous waste disposal practices, both houses of Congress recognized that existing federal
statutes could not resolve the hazardous waste problems. See S. RaP. No. 848, supra, at
10-11 (1980)(noting absence of federal law establishing liability for releases of hazardous
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creates two federal causes of action that federal and state governments

wastes into environment); H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra, at 18 (noting that existing law clearly
cannot deal with massive problem of hazardous waste disposal practices). In particular, both
houses of Congress focused on the inadequacies of the Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act of 1976 (RCRA), which provides a comprehensive regulatory program for the treatment,
storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. S. REP. No. 848, supra, at 10-11; H.R. REP. No.
1016, supra, at 22; see Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94580, §§ 1001-8007, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976)(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-86 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)). The House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce noted that the RCRA
is prospective, applying to past hazardous waste disposal practices only if an imminent
hazard exists. H.R. RP. No. 1016, supra, at 22. Moreover, the House committee reported
that the RCRA fails to remedy the problems associated with a hazardous waste site if the
government cannot locate a financially responsible owner of the site. Id. Similarly, the
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works observed that RCRA regulations do
not provide a remedy if an owner of an abandoned hazardous waste site is unknown or is
unable to pay cleanup costs. S. REP. No. 848, supra, at 11. The Senate Committee also
observed that RCRA regulations do not address the cleanup of spills, illegal dumping, or
general releases of hazardous wastes. Id. Accordingly, both houses of Congress sought to
remedy the inability of RCRA to deal with the problem of abandoned and inactive hazardous
waste disposal sites. See H.R. REp. No. 1016, supra, at 22 (noting that House Committee
intened H.R. 7020 to amend RCRA); S. RaP. No. 848, supra, at 12 (goal of S. 1480 is to
complement RCRA and other federal environmental statutes); see also United States v. Shell
Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1071 n.1 (D. Colo. 1985) (recognizing that Congress enacted
CERCLA in response to inadequacies of RCRA).
In responding to the inability of existing federal law to deal with the problems associated
with inactive and abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites, both the House of Representatives and the Senate shared two concerns that survived the final amendments of CERCLA.
See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra, at 17 (discussing purpose of H.R. 7020); S. RPP. No. 848,
supra, at 12-13 (stating goals of S. 1480); see also United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical
Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1112 (D.Minn. 1982)(noting that Committee Reports accompanying competing congressional bills share two concerns). First, Congress intended immediately to provide the federal government with authority for a prompt and effective response
to national problems of hazardous waste disposal. See H.R. RaP. No. 1016, supra, at 22
(declaring that intent of H.R. 7020 is to initiate and establish a comprehensive response and
financing mechanism to abate and control problems associated with abandoned and inactive
hazardous waste sites); S. REP. No. 848, supra, at 12-13 (declaring that goals of S. 1480
include providing ample federal response authority to cleanup hazardous waste disasters and
to create fund to finance response action if liable party cannot be found or is unable to
pay cost of cleanup); see also Reilly Tar, 546 F. Supp. at 1112 (noting that Congress
intended to provide federal government tools necessary for prompt and effective response
to hazardous waste disposal problems). Second, in enacting CERCLA, Congress intended
to impose the costs of remedying the harmful conditions associated with hazardous waste
sites upon the parties responsible for creating the harmful conditions. See H.R. RP. No.
1016, supra, at 17-19 (noting that H.R. 7020 is intended to create liability for persons who
release hazardous waste); S. RaP. No. 848, supra, at 12-13 (stating that goals of S. 1480
include assuring that parties who are responsible for any damage, environmental harm, or
injury resulting from releases of hazardous waste bear ensuing costs); see also Reilly Tar,
546 F. Supp. at 1112 (noting that Congress intended that parties responsible for disposal of
hazardous waste bear costs and responsibility for harmful conditions they created). See
generally Eckhardt, The Unfinished Business of Hazardous Waste Control, 33 BAYLOR L.
REv. 253 (1981)(discussing legislative history of CERCLA); Grad, A Legislative History of
the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability ("Superfund")
Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENv. L. I (1982)(same).
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may bring against a party who owns or operates a facility that releases
hazardous substances 2 into the environment or a party who generates,
transports, or contracts to dispose of hazardous substances that eventually
escape into the environment. 3 First, CERCLA authorizes federal and state
governments to respond to actual and threatened releases of hazardous
4
substances and to sue responsible parties for the ensuing response costs.

2. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 (22), (14) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (defining terms "release"
and "hazardous substances" under CERCLA). CERCLA broadly defines the term "release"
to include the following events that cause hazardous substances to escape into the environment: spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment. Id. at § 9601 (22). In addition, CERCLA
authorizes governments to respond to actual and threatened releases of a wide range of
harmful substances. See id. at § 9601(14)(defining term "hazardous substances" under
CERCLA). CERCLA incorporates by reference the substances that various environmental
statutes designate as hazardous or toxic. Id.; see id. at § 7412 (defining hazardous air
pollutants under Clean Air Act); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1317(a), 1321(b)(2)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986)(defining hazardous substances under Federal Water Pollution Control Act); 42 U.S.C.
§ 6921 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(defining hazardous substances under Solid Waste Disposal
Act); 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(defining hazardous substances under Toxic
Substances Control Act). In addition, CERCLA authorizes the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to designate additional substances that may present substantial
danger to the public health or the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(establishing liability for costs of
cleaning up releases of hazardous substances and for damages that releases cause to natural
resources); infra notes 13-36 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's liability provisions). Section 107(a) of CERCLA identifies the following four categories of parties who
federal and state governments may sue for response costs and damages to natural resources
resulting from releases of hazardous substances: 1) the -current owner or operator of a
facility that releases hazardous substances; 2) the.party who owned or operated a facility
that had released hazardous substances in the past; 3) parties who contract with third parties
for the disposal or treatment of hazardous substances or for the transport for disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances; 4) and parties who transport hazardous substances to
disposal or treatment facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see infra note
4 (discussing types of actions that CERCLA authorizes federal and state governments to
take in response to releases of hazardous substances).
4. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604(a), 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(authorizing federal
and state government responses to releases of hazardous substances and subsequent recovery
of response costs from responsible parties). CERCLA authorizes federal and state governments to undertake two different types of responses to releases of hazardous substances.
See id. at § 9604(a) (authorizing removal and remedial actions in response to releases of
hazardous substances). CERCLA first authorizes federal and state governments to conduct
removal actions to protect the public and the environment from the immediate hazards
associated with releases of hazardous substances. Id. Under CERCLA removal actions
include cleaning up or removing the hazardous substances, as well as monitoring, assessing
or evaluating the release of hazardous substances. See id. at § 9601(23)(defining terms
.,remove" or "removal" as used under CERCLA). Removal actions under CERCLA also
include providing for alternate water supplies, and providing temporary housing to individuals whose health may be in danger as a result of arelease of hazardous substances. Id.
In addition, CERCLA authorizes federal and state governments to conduct remedial
actions. Id. at § 9604(a). Under CERCLA the term "remedial action" represents permanent
solutions to the environmental contamination that results from releases of hazardous subst-
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Second, CERCLA authorizes federal and state governments, acting as

public trustees of natural resources, to sue responsible parties for the
damages to natural resources resulting from releases of hazardous subst6
ances. 5 By recognizing and expanding the common-law public trust doctrine

ances. See id. at § 9601(24)(defining terms "remedy" and "remedial action" as used under
CERCLA). Section 101(24) of CERCLA provides that remedial actions include storing,
confining, neutralizing or cleaning up the released hazardous substances. Id. Section 101(24)
provides that remedial actions also include recycling, destroying, or segregating reactive
hazardous substances, as well as dredging, excavating, repairing or replacing damaged
hazardous substance containers. Id. See generally City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633
F. Supp. 609, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1986)(discussing removal and remedial actions under
CERCLA); United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1117 n.5
(D.Minn. 1982)(same); Note, Theories of State Recovery Under CERCLA for Injuries to
the Environment, 24 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1101, 1105-06 n.33 (1984) (same)[hereinafter "Note,
Theories of State Recovery"].
While authorizing federal and state governments to undertake removal and remedial
actions in response to releases of hazardous substances, CERCLA authorizes governments
to recover the ensuing costs from two sources. First, CERCLA provides that governments
may sue various responsible parties to recover the costs that the governments incurred in
responding to a release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(A) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986). Second, CERCLA establishes a fund, commonly known as the Superfund, to
finance federal and state removal and remedial actions. See id. at § 9631 (establishing
Hazardous Substance Response Fund) replaced by Pub. L. No. 99-499, § 517, 100 Stat.
1615 (1986)(codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). If parties responsible for
the release of hazardous substances are unknown or are unwilling to pay response costs,
governments may file a claim against the fund for the amount the government incurred in
cleaning up the release of hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 9611(a), 9612 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986) (authorizing President of United States to expend Superfund monies to finance
cleanup of hazardous waste sites).
In addition to authorizing federal and state governments to undertake removal and
remedial actions in response to releases of hazardous substances and to recover the ensuing
costs from responsible parties or from the Superfund, CERCLA authorizes the Attorney
General of the United States to force responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste sites
and releases. See id. at § 9606 (establishing federal authority to secure abatement actions).
Section 106(a) of CERCLA authorizes the Attorney General to seek an injunction in federal
district court to force a responsible party to clean up a hazardous waste site or a spill of
hazardous waste that represents an imminent danger to public health or to the environment.
Id. See generally Note, Section 106 of CERCLA: An Alternative to Superfund Liability, 12
B.C. ENrVTL. L. REv. 381 (1985)(discussing scope of government's power under § 106 of
CERCLA to force responsible parties to clean up hazardous waste sites)[hereinafter "Note,
Section 106"].
5. 42 U.S.C § 9607 (a)(4)(c), (f)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); see infra notes 13-36
and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
6. See W. RODoERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 2.16, at 170-77 (1977)(discussing common-law public trust doctrine). The public trust doctrine is a legal fiction that evolved from
Roman and common-law notions that the public possesses inalienable rights in natural
resources that are too important to be subject to private ownership. See Lazarus, Changing
Conceptions of Propertyand Sovereignty in NaturalResources: Questioning the Public Trust
Doctrine, 71 IDAHO L. REv. 631, 656 (1987)(noting that principles of public trust doctrine
are judicially created methods to justify treating differently governmental transactions that
involve natural resources); Note, The Public Trust Doctrine as a Basis for Environmental
Litigation in Louisiana, 27 Loy. L. REv. 469, 469 (1981)(noting that public trust doctrine
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in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions, Congress provided

federal and state officials with a broad federal cause of action to restore
and preserve all natural resources that suffer damages from releases of

hazardous substances. 7 Moreover, in enacting the Superfund Amendments
and Reauthorization Act of 1986,8 Congress reaffirmed and clarified its
intent to create a federal cause of action for restoring natural resources
that suffer damages from releases of hazardous substances. 9

Pursuant to CERCLA, the United States Department of the Interior
(DOI) has promulgated natural resource damage assessment regulations
that federal and state governments may employ to measure natural resource
damages under CERCLA.10 By adopting the common-law approach to

measuring property damage, the DOI regulations inhibit the federal and
state governments' ability to restore natural resources that suffer damages
from releases of hazardous substances." To preserve Congress' intent to
restore or replace natural resources that suffer damages from releases of

is judge made, evolving from Roman and common-law principles). Accordingly, the commonlaw public trust doctrine recognizes that the government holds certain natural resources in
trust for the benefit of the public. W. RoGERS, supra, § 2.16, at 171. The doctrine provides
that governments must protect the public resources against unfair dealing and dissipation.
Id. at 172. Historically, courts applied the public trust doctrine to protect the public's
interest in navigable waterways and tidal lands. Id.; see infra notes 76-77 and accompanying
text (discussing early United States Supreme Court cases applying public trust doctrine).
Moreover, courts had limited the doctrine to protect a limited variety of public uses,
including navigation, commerce, and fishing. W. RoGRs, supra, § 2.16, at 172. Courts,
however, have expanded the public trust doctrine to protect additional natural resources
and public uses. Id.; see infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text (discussing judiciary's
expansion of public trust doctrine). See generally 1 V. YANNACONE & B. COHEN, ENVIoNMENTAL RIGHTS AND REMEDMS § § 2:1-14, at 11-60 (1972)(discussing historical development
and application of public trust doctrine); Sax, The Public Trust Doctrinein NaturalResource
Law: Affective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REv. 471 (1970)(analyzing public trust
doctrine as source of important environmental law).
7. See infra notes 90-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' recognition
and expansion of public trust doctrine).
8. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499,
100 Stat. 1615 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C § § 9601-9657 (1982 & Supp. IV
1986).
9. See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 4, at 50 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMI. NEws 2835, 3080 (noting that restoration or replacement
of damaged natural resources is primary purpose of CERCLA's natural resource damage
provisions); infra notes 105-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent, in
enacting and amending CERCLA, to authorize governments to recover cost 6f restoring
natural resources that suffer damages from releases of hazardous substances).
10. See Natural Resource Damage Assessment Regulations, 43 C.F.R. § 11 (1987);
infra notes 90-127 and accompanying text (discussing United States Department of Interior's
(DOI) natural resource damage assessment regulations).
11. See Kenison, Buchholz & Mulligan, State Actions for Natural Resource Damages:
Enforcement of the Public Trust, 17 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10434, 10434
(1987)(contending that DOI damage assessment regulations limit scope and nature of state
governments role in preserving and protecting natural resources); see also infra notes 128148 and accompanying text (criticizing DOI's damage assessment regulations).
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hazardous waste, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia should strike certain provisions of the DOI's damage assessment
regulations as arbitrary or capricious or otherwise not in accordance with
the law.12
I.

CERCLA's NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE PROVISIONS

CERCLA contains several sections that govern the scope of a federal
or state government's action against parties who damage natural resources
by releasing hazardous substances into the environment.'" Section 107
contains provisions that establish and outline liability under CERCLA for
natural resource damages.' 4 Section 107(a)(4)(C) establishes liability for
any injury, destruction or loss of natural resources resulting from releases
of hazardous substances.'" Section 107(f) declares that federal and state
governments, acting on behalf of the public as trustees for natural re-

12. See 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(providing that United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia is only court that has jurisdiction to review
regulations that government promulgates under CERCLA); see also The Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, § 706 (codified at 5 U.S.C. § 706
(1982)) (providing scope of review when party challenges federal agency's action); Cheveron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (defining
proper scope of judicial review of federal agency's interpretation of statutory provisions).
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 415-16 (1971) (discussing scope
of judicial review of agency actions). Section 706 of the APA directs an appellate court to
invalidate or set aside federal agency actions that are arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of
discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with the law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (1982). Section
706 also directs an appellate court to set aside an agency action that violates a constitutional
right or that exceeds the statutory authority of an agency. Id. Several states and environmental interest groups have challenged the validity of several provisions of the DOI's damage
assessment regulations, including the DOI's rule requiring federal and state trustees to use
the lesser of restoration costs and diminution in use value as the measure of damages to
natural resources. See Ohio v. Department of Interior, No. 86-1529 (D.C. Cir., consolidated
with National Wildlife Fed'n v. Department of Interior, No. 86-1575, July 13, 1987); see
also infra notes 129-148 and accompanying text (criticizing DOI's damage assessment
regulations).
13. See infra notes 14-36 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
14. See 42 U.S.C § 9607(a), (f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(establishing liability for
damages to natural resouces resulting from release of hazardous substances).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(4)(C) (1982 & Supp IV 1986). Section 107 of CERCLA creates
two exceptions to liability for any injury, destruction or loss of natural resources resulting
from releases of hazardous substances. See id. at § 9607(0. First, section 107(0 bars liability
for damages to natural resources that governments have authorized through a permit or
license proceeding as irreversible and irretrievable commitments of natural resources. Id.
Second, section 107(0 prohibits a government trustee from recovering damages for injuries
to natural resources if the injuries and the release of hazardous substances that caused the
injuries occurred before Congress enacted CERCLA. Id.; see infra note 24 (noting that
CERCLA creates three limited affirmative defenses to liability under CERCLA). -Seegenerally
Warren & Zackrison, Natural Resources Damages Provisions of CERCLA, NAT. REsoUiRcEs
& ENV'T 18, 21-48 (1985)(discussing exceptions to liability for natural resource damages
under CERCLA).
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sources, may assert a claim for natural resource damages under CERCLA.' 6
Accordingly, section 107(f) requires the President of the United States and
the governor of each state to designate officials who will act on behalf of
the public as trustees for natural resources.' 7 Section 107(f) also requires

the designated federal and state trustees to assess the extent of natural
resource damages from the release of hazardous substances and to recover

the natural resource damages from responsible parties., Moreover, section
107(f) provides that damage assessments may not limit liability for natural
resource damages to the cost of restoring or replacing the damaged

resources.' 9 Section 107(f), however, requires a government trustee to use
natural resource damage awards to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of the damaged natural resources*20
Section 101 of CERCLA defines two terms that govern the scope of
federal and state governments' claims for natural resource damages. 2 '
Section 101(16) broadly defines the term "natural resources" to encompass
a wide variety of natural objects that federal, state, and local governments

either own, manage, or control.22 Additionally, section 101(32) defines the

16. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In addition to authorizing federal
and state governments to assert claims for natural resource damages, section 107(f) of
CERCLA authorizes foreign governments and Indian tribes to seek recovery for natural
resource damages under CERCLA. Id. Moreover, courts have interpreted CERCLA to
authorize local governments to assert natural resource damage claims under CERCLA. See
City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633 F. Supp. 609, 617-18 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (holding that
City of New York is proper plaintiff to bring claim for natural resource damages under
CERCLA); Mayor of Boonton v. Drew Chemical Corp., 621 F. Supp. 663, 667 (D.C.N.J.
1985) (holding that municipalities have standing under CERCLA to sue for natural resource
damages). CERCLA does not, however, authorize private persons to assert claims for natural
resource damages. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(stating that responsible
parties are liable only to Indian tribes and federal, state, and foreign governments for
natural resource damages); United States v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transp. Auth., No.
86-1094 (E.D. Pa. July 2, 1986)(WESTLAW, FedCTs library, Allfeds file)(holding that
private cause of action for damages to natural resources does not exist under CERCLA);
see also Habicht, The Expanding Role of Natural Resource Damage Claims Under Superfund,
7 VA. J. NAT. REsOURCE L. 1, 8 (1987)(noting that CERCLA does not grant private persons
right to claim damages for injury to natural resources).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
18. 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(C), (f)(1) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In addition to authorizing
government trustees to recover natural resource damages, section 107 authorizes the trustees
to recover the reasonable costs of assessing natural resource damages and the interest on
the amount of damages that the trustees eventually recover. Id. at § 9607(a).
19. Id. at § 9607(f)(1).
20. Id.; see infra notes 105-127 and accompanying text (interpreting language of
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions to mandate recovery of costs of restoring
damaged natural resources).
21. See 42 U.S.C § 9601 (1982"& Supp. IV 1986)(defining terms used under CERCLA);
infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing terms "natural resources" and "liability" as used under CEROLA).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(16) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). Section 101(16) of CERCLA defines
the term "natural resources" to include land, fish, wildlife, biota, air, water, ground water,
drinking water supplies and other such resources belonging to, appertaining to, managed
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term "liability" as the standard of liability that exists under section 311(c)
of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA).23 Because courts
have interpreted section 311 of the FWPCA to create strict liability,
CERCLA holds responsible parties strictly liable for the damages that
releases of hazardous substances inflict on a wide range of natural re-

sources .2
by, held in trust by, or otherwise controlled by the United States or any state or local
government. Id.
23. See id. at § 101(32)(defining term "liability" under CERCLA); The Federal Water
Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), Pub. L. No. 87-88, § 331, 86 Stat. 816 (codified as
amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982)) (defining term "liability" under FWPCA); see also
infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing courts interpretation of liability under the
FWPCA and CERCLA).
24. See United States v. LeBeouf Bros. Towing Co., 621 F.2d 787, 789 (5th Cir.
1980) (noting that FWPCA embraces standard of strict liability); Steuart Transp. Co. v.
Allied Towing, 596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979)(noting that legislative history of FWPCA
indicates that FWPCA embodies standard of strict liability). See generally Note, Liability
Without Fault Under the Federal Water Pollution ControlAct, 19 NAT. RzsomRcEs J. 687,
692 (1979) (reviewing cases that interpret § 311 of FWPCA to create strict liability). Although
CERCLA's statutory language does not explicitly provide for strict liability, CERCLA's
legislative history indicates that Congress intended to create a standard of strict liability
under CERCLA. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir.
1985)(noting Congress' intent to create strict liability under CERCLA). In considering
legislation to abate and control problems associated with releases of hazardous waste, both
houses of Congress passed bills that provided for strict liability. See S. 1480, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. § 4(a), 126 CONG. REC. 30908 (1979)(creating strict liability standard); H.R. 7020,
96th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 3071(a)(1)(D), 126 CONG. Rac. 26,779 (1979)(same). As part of a
compromise, however, sponsors of both bills agreed to remove strict liability language from
CERCLA and to insert a reference to liability under the FWPCA. See 126 CONG. Rc.
30,932 (1980)(statement of Sen. Randolph)(noting that, by specifying standard of liability
under § 311 of FWPCA, sponsors of CERCLA kept strict liability in compromise); Shore
Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 n.13 (noting compromise that eliminated strict liability provision
from CERCLA). Although sponsors of the Senate and House bills agreed to remove the
term strict liability from CERCLA, the sponsors nonetheless conceded that CERCLA
provides for strict liability. See 126 CONG. REc. 30,932 (1980)(statement of Sen. Randolph)(noting that standard of strict liability exists under CERCLA). Moreover, courts have
determined that CERCLA embraces a standard of strict liability. See, e.g., J.V. Peters &
Co., Inc. v. Administrator, EPA, 767 F.2d 263, 266 (6th Cir. 1985) (noting that CERCLA
imposes strict liability); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 (noting that Congress intended to
impose standard of strict liability under CERCLA); United States v. Dickerson, 640 F.
Supp. 448, 451 (D.Md. 1986)(holding that CERCLA imposes strict liability, subject to very
limited defenses). In sum, the legislative history of CERCLA and court interpretations of
CERCLA and section 311 of the FWPCA provide that CERCLA embraces a standard of
strict liability.
Although CERCLA embraces a standard of strict liability, CERCLA does not embrace
a standard of absolute liability. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1042 (noting that strict
liability under CERCLA is not absolute). Section 107(b) of CERCLA provides that acts of
nature, war, and of certain third parties constitute affirmative defenses to liability under
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C § 9607(b) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). In establishing a third party defense,
section 107(b) excludes liability for release of hazardous substances resulting from acts of
strangers, but not for acts and omissions of an employee or an agent of a CERCLA
defendant or of one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contractual
relationship with the defendant. Id.; see supra note 15 (discussing specific exceptions to
liability for damages to natural resources resulting from releases of hazardous substances).
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While section 101 of CERCLA defines two terms that govern the
scope of liability for natural resource damages, section 301(C) of CERCLA
contains provisions that govern the scope of a government trustee's natural
resource damage assessments.Y Section 301(c) requires the President of
the United States to promulgate two types of regulations for assessing
natural resource damages under CERCLA. 26 Section 301(c) first requires
the President to create standard procedures for simplified assessments that
require only minimal field observation to assess natural resource damages
(type A regulations). 27 Additionally, section 301(c) requires the President
to establish standard alternative procedures for conducting case-by-case
assessments of short-term and long-term damages to natural resources
(type B regulations).2 Moreover, section 301(c) states that the federal
regulations must identify the best available procedures for determining
both direct and indirect natural resource damages from releases of hazardous substances. 29 Section 301(c) also provides that the federal regulations must consider the factors that may affect natural resource damage
assessments, including replacement value, use value, and the ability of the
30
ecosystem or the resource to recover without any government action. If
a government trustee measures natural resource damages in accordance
with the regulations that the President promulgates pursuant to section
301(c), CERCLA provides that the trustee's damage assessment has the
force and effect of a rebuttable presumption in any action that the trustee
3
brings against a responsible party under CERCLA. 1
Realizing that the costs of establishing liability under CERCLA might
exceed the costs of cleaning up hazardous waste sites; Congress recently
amended CERCLA by adding provisions that authorize and govern settlements of CERCLA actions. 32 In enacting these new settlement provisions,
25. See 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (requiring President of the United
States to promulgate rules for measuring natural resource damages under CERCLA); infra
notes 26-31 and accompanying text (discussing § 301(c) of CERCLA).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
27. Id. at § 9651(c)(2). The legislative history of CERCLA indicates that Congress
intended governments to use type A damage assessment regulations when minor releases of
hazardous substances damage natural resources. See S. REP. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.
86 (1980)(stating that simplified type of regulation is necessary to deal effectively with
damage assessment in "minor" releases of hazardous substances).
28. 42 U.S.C § 9651(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986). The legislative history of CERCLA
indicates that Congress intended governments to use type B regulations if large or unusually
destructive releases occur and to guide site-specific damage assessments. See S. REP. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 86 (1980)(discussing difference between type A and Type B natural
resource damage assessments).
29. 42 U.S.C § 9651(c)(2) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
30. Id.
31. Id. at § 107(0.
32. See 131 CONG. REc. S1208 (1985)(statements of Sen. Domenici)(noting CERCLA
case in which United States Environmental Protection Agency estimates that site clean up
will cost $10.5 million and that total litigation costs will exceed $35 million); infra notes
33-36 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's settlement provisions governing natural

resource damage claims).
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Congress created specific guidelines for settling government claims for

natural resource damages.33 Specifically, Congress enacted a provision that
requires the federal government to notify the designated federal natural
resource trustee if settlement negotiations address liability for a release of
hazardous substances that damaged natural resources.14 The new provision
permits the federal trustee to include a covenant not to sue for natural
resource damages in a proposed settlement offer. 35 The new provision,
however, prohibits the federal trustee from agreeing to the covenant unless
the responsible party has agreed to protect and restore the damaged natural
6

resources.
II.

3

THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR'S NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE
ASSESSMENT REGULATIONS

Pursuant to section 301(c) of CERCLA, the DOI promulgated natural
resource damage assessment regulations on August 1, 1986.1 7 The DOI
regulations provide that federal and state governments that bring natural

resource damage claims do not have to comply with the damage assessment
regulations. 38 In accordance with CERCLA's mandate, however, the DOI
regulations provide that federal and state trustees must comply with the

DOI regulations to obtain a rebuttable presumption that the trustees'

damage assessment is correct. 39 To ensure that all damage assessment
procedures are appropriate, necessary, and sufficient to assess damages

33. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, § 122(j), 100 Stat. 1615 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 96220))(1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(establishing
guidelines for settling natural resource damage claims).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See Natural Resource Damage Assessments, 43 C.F.R. § 11 (1987). By Executive
Order 12,316, the President of the United States delegated the responsibility to promulgate
natural resource damage assessment regulations to the Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior. See 42 U.S.C. § 9651(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(requiring the
President of the United States to promulgate natural resource damage assessments); Exec.
Order No. 12,316 § 8(c), 46 Fed. Reg. 42,237 (1981)(delegating President's authority to
promulgate natural resource damage assessments to DOI); see also supra notes 25-31 and
accompanying text (discussing § 301(c) of CERCLA). On May 28, 1987, the DOI proposed
to amend the DOI's natural resource damage assessment regulations to conform to changes
necessitated by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986. See 52 Fed.
Reg. 12886 (1987) (proposing changes to DOI's natural resource damage assessment regulations); Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (1986). The DOI issued a final rule that adopted
the proposed amendments on February 28, 1988, noting that the final rule became effective
on March 22, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 5166 (1988)(presenting final amendments to natural
resource damages assessment regulations).
38. 43 C.F.R. § 11.10 (1987).
39. See id. at § 11.10 (stating that DOI's damage assessment regulations are not
mandatory); 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(stating that trustee damage
assessments that comply with regulations promulgated pursuant to § 301(c) of CERCLA
have force and effect of rebuttable presumption that damage assessment is correct).
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for injuries to natural resources, the DOI regulations set forth a multi40
phase approach to assessing natural resource damages under CERCLA.
The first phase of the DOI's damage assessment regulations, termed

the "Preassessment Phase," requires the government trustee to conduct a
preassessment review of the effects of a release of hazardous substances
on natural resources. 4' The Preassessment Phase regulations require the

trustee to conduct a rapid review of readily available information to
determine whether the trustee should conduct a damage assessment. 42 The
regulations prohibit the trustee from conducting a natural resource damage
assessment if the preassessment review reveals that a release of hazardous
substances could not have caused an injury to a natural resource or that
planned response actions sufficiently will remedy the injury to natural
resources.

43

If the government trustee's preassessment review justifies the expense
of conducting a natural resource damage assessment, the second phase of
the DOI's damage assessment process, termed the "Assessment Plan
44
Phase," requires the government trustee to prepare an assessment plan.
To ensure that the trustee assesses natural resource damages in a planned,
systematic and cost-effective manner, the Assessment Plan Phase regulations require the trustee to prepare a detailed damage assessment plan that
identifies the scientific and economic methods that the trustee intends to
use to measure natural resource damage. 4 The regulations provide that

40. 43 C.F.R. § 11.13 (1987)(presenting general overview of DOI's damage assessment
regulations); infra notes 41-65 and accompanying text (discussing DOI's multi-phase damage
assessment regulations).
41. See 43 C.F.R. §§ 11.20-.25 (1987)(DOI's Pre-Assessment Phase regulations). In
addition to requiring a trustee to conduct a pre-assessment review, the DOI's Pre-Assessment
Phase regulations requires government officials who investigate releases of hazardous substances to notify federal and state trustees when a release has injured or is likely to injure a
natural resource. Id. at § 11.20. Moreover, the Pre-Assessment Phase regulations authorize
natural resource trustees to request an immediate response action if a release of hazardous
substances threatens to cause an irreversible loss of natural resources. See id. at § 11.21
(authorizing natural resource trustees to request immediate response actions to releases of
hazardous substances).
42. Id. at § 11.23(a). The DOI's Pre-Assessment Phase regulations explain that the
trustee's pre-assessment review of available data should ensure that a reasonable probability
exists that the trustee will make a successful natural resource damage claim before the trustee
incurs the expense of conducting a full damage assessment. Id. at § 11.23(b).
43. See id. at § 11.23(e)(presenting criteria that trustee's pre-assessment review must
meet before trustee conducts natural resource damage assessment).
44. See id. at § 11.30-.35 (presenting DOI's Assessment Plan Phase regulations); infra
notes 45-46 and accompanying text (discussing DOI's Assessment Plan Phase reglilations).
45. 43 C.F.R. § 11.30-.32 (1987)(reviewing required contents of trustee's assessment
plan). In addition to requiring the trustee to prepare a detailed damage assessment plan,
the Assessment Plan Phase regulations require the trustee to notify potentially responsible
parties of the trustee's intent to conduct a damage assessment and to invite the parties to
participate in the damage assessment process. Id. at § 11.32(a)(2). Moreover, the regulations
require the trustee to invite interested members of the public to review and comment on the
trustee's assessment plan. Id. at § 11.32(c).
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the proper economic measure of natural resource damage is the lesser of
the difference in the natural resources' use value before and after the
46
damage and the costs of restoring the resource to its original condition.
The third phase of the DOI's damage assessment process, termed the
"Injury Determination Phase," requires the trustee to determine whether
a release of hazardous substances has injured one or more natural resources. 47 While the definitional section of the DOI regulations define
"injury" as a measurable adverse changein the chemical or physical
quality or viability of a natural resource, 48 the Injury Determination Phase
regulations present scientific methods that trustees must use to determine
whether a release of hazardous substances has injured a specific type of
natural resources. 49 Moreover, the regulations require the trustee to conduct
two essential inquiries to ensure that only assessments involving welldocumented injuries proceed through the final phases of the DOI's damage
assessment process.5 0 The regulations first require the trustee to employ
specific scientific methods to determine whether an injury has occurred to
a natural resource. 51 If the trustee determines that an injury has occurred,
the regulations require the trustee to determine whether the injury most
likely resulted from a release of hazardous substances. 52 If the trustee
determines that a natural resource has not suffered an injury or fails to
identify a connection between a release of hazardous substances and an
injured natural resource, the Injury Determination Phase regulations prohibit the trustee from continuing the damage assessment. 53

46. Id. at § 11.35(2); see infra notes 54-65 and accompanying text (discussing DOI
regulations explaining methods for ascertaining cost of restoration and value of damaged
natural resources); infra notes 127-149 and accompanying text (criticizing DOI's damage
assessment regulations).
47. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.62 (1987)(presenting DOI's Injury Determination Phase regulations).
48. Id. at § 11.14(v)(defining term "injury" as used under DOI's damage assessment
regulations).
49. See id. at § 11.62 (establishing guidelines for determining whether releases of
hazardous substances have injured different categories of natural resources). Section 11.62
of the DOI's damage assessment regulations present scientific methods for determining
whether releases of hazardous substances have injured surface water resources, groundwater
resources, air resources, geologic resources, and biological resources. Id. at § 11.62(b)-(f).
50. See id. at § 11.61 (presenting general description and purpose of Injury Determination Phase regulations); infra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (discussing two inquiries
that natural resource trustee must undertake when determining whether release of hazardous
substances has injured natural resources).
51. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.61(c) (1987).
52. Id. at § 11.61(a). To determine whether an injury to a natural resource resulted
from a release of hazardous substances, the DOI's Injury Determination Phase regulations
require the trustee to determine the route through which the hazardous substances travelled
from the source of the release to the injured resource. Id. at § 11.61(c)(3). The DOI
regulations provide the trustee with detailed scientific methods for determining the exposure
pathways of releases of hazardous substances. See id. at § 11.63 (presenting methods for
analyzing hazardous substance exposure pathways).
53. Id. at § 11.61(e)(3).

19881

NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE

1429

If the trustee determines that a release of hazardous substances has
injured a natural resource, the fourth phase of the DOI's damage assessment regulations, termed the "Injury Quantification Phase," requires the
trustee to quantify the injury to the natural resource.5 4 To quantify the
natural resource injuries, the regulations require the trustee to determine
the extent that the natural resources' injuries reduce the level of services
that natural resources provide to the environment and to the public. 5 5 The
regulations first require the trustee to measure the level of services that
the injured resources provided to the environment and the general public
before the release of the hazardous substances.5 6 The regulations next
require the trustee to compare the pre-release level of resource services to
the level of services that the resources currently provide to the environment
and the general public. 57 The regulations provide that the decrease in total
services represent the basis for determining the dollar value of natural
5
resource damages resulting from releases of hazardous substances. 1
After the trustee measures the decrease in the total services that the
injured natural resources provide to the public and the environment, the
fifth phase of the DOI's damage assessment process, termed the "Damage
Assessment Phase," requires the trustee to estimate the dollar value of
the lost services.5 9 The Damage Assessment regulations require the trustee
to assess damages in accordance with the economic method of measuring
damages that the trustee selected in the Assessment Plan phase. ° If the
trustee determined that the cost of restoring the injured natural resource
was the proper economic measure of damages, the DOI regulations require
the trustee to calculate only the costs of restoring the injured resources'
services to the level of services that the resource provided before the release
of hazardous substances. 61 Alternatively, if the trustee determined that the

54. See id. at § 11.70-.73 (presenting DOI's Injury Quantification Phase regulations).
55. Id. at § 11.71(a).
56. Id. at § 11.72. To determine the quantity and quality of services that the injured
resource provided in its pre-injury state, the Injury Determination Phase regulations require
the trustee to study historical data that describe the health of the local ecosystem prior to
release of hazardous substances. See id. at § 11.72 (presenting methods for determining level
of services that injured resource provided prior to release of hazardous substances).
57. See id. at § 11.71 (presenting DOI's Injury Quantification Phase regulations).
58. See id. at § 1l.70(b)(noting that purpose of Injury Quantification Phase is to
determine appropriate amount of compensation for natural resource damages).
59. See id. at § 11.80(b)(stating that purpose of Damage Determination phase is to
estimate dollar value of natural resource damages).
60. Id. at § 11.80(c); see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text (discussing DOI's
Assessment Plan phase regulations).
61. 43 C.F.R. § 11.81(c) (1987). If the government trustee intends to restore damaged
natural resources, the Damage Assessment regulations require the trustee to develop a
restoration plan to ensure that the trustee uses only cost-effective procedures to restore the
injured natural resources. Id. at § 11.82(a), (b). The regulations require the trustee to
describe all management actidns or resource acquisitions that are necessary to restore the
injured resources and to provide sufficient detail to allow an informed choice of the most
cost effective alternative method of restoring or replacing damaged natural resources. Id.
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reduction in the natural resources' use value was the proper economic
measure of damages, the Damage Phase regulations require the trustee to

calculate damages by determining the value of the lost public uses of the
resource. 62 The regulations require the trustee to consider only committed

public uses63 of the resources' services and prohibit the trustee from
considering purely speculative public uses of the injured resources.

4

After

the trustee identifies the appropriate public uses, the regulations require
the trustee to use either a market price method or a land appraisal method
to estimate the monetary value of the lost public uses. 65
The final phase of the DOI's natural resource damage assessment
process, termed the "Post-Assessment Phase," requires the trustee to

prepare a Record of Assessment (ROA) before filing suit against potentially
responsible parties. 66 The Post-Assessment Phase regulations state that the

ROA constitutes the administrative record of the damage assessment
process for purposes of judicial or administrative review.67 In review, if a
government trustee desires to obtain the rebuttable presumption that the

government's damage assessment is correct, the trustee must adhere to the
DOI's complex multi-phase damage assessment process that requires the

62. See id. at § 11.83 (presenting methods for determining use values of damages to
natural resources). Section 11.83(b) of the DOI's Damage Determination phase regulations
defines the term "use value" as the value to the public of recreational or other public uses
of natural resources. Id. at § 11.83(b); see infra note 65 (discussing methods for estimating
lost use value).
63. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.14(h) (1987)(defining term "committed use" under DOI damage
assessment regulations). Section 11.14(h) of the DOI's damage assessment regulations defines
the term "committed use" as a current public use or a planned public use that is part of a
currently documented legal, administrative, or financial commitment. Id.
64. Id. at § 11.84(2); see also supra note 63 (presenting DOI's definition of term
"committed use").
65. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.83(c) (1987)(presenting methods for determining dollar value
of lost public uses). If the government trustee determines that a market for the damaged
resource is reasonably competitive, the DOI Damage Determination phase regulations require
the trustee to estimate the dollar value of the lost public uses by measuring the diminution
in the market price of the damaged resources. Id. at § 11.83(c)(1). If the trustee determines
that a reasonably competitive market does not exist, the DOI regulations require the trustee
to use an appraisal method for determining the dollar value of lost public uses. See id. at
§ 11.83(c)(2) (explaining appraisal method for determining lost use value). If the trustee
determines that the neither the market price method or the appraisal method is an appropriate, the regulations allow the trustee to employ less traditional methods of determining
the economic value of lost public uses. See id. at § 11.83(d)(describing factor income, travel
cost, hedonic, contingent valuation, and unit value methods of determining dollar value of
lost public uses resulting from releases of hazardous substances).
66. See id. at § 11.90 (DOI's Post-Assessment Plan phase regulations); infra note 67
(discussing details of Record of Assessment).
67. 43 C.F.R. § 11.90 (1987). The Post-Assessment Phase regulations require the
trustee to include within the ROA the trustee's preassessment screen determination, the
assessment plan, documentation supporting the determinations that the trustee reached in
the Injury Determination Phase, and a record of the public comment received during the
damage assessment process. Id.
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trustee to proceed in a cost-effective manner and to establish a welldocumented account of the damage assessment.68
III.

Do THE DOI REGULATIONS CONTRAVENE CERCLA's NATURAL
RESOURCE DAMAGE PROVISIONS?

Since Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980, state governments have
brought numerous suits under CERCLA to recover damages for injuries
to natural resources resulting from releases of hazardous substances.6 9
Although these lawsuits have required courts to address several procedural
issues, 70 the lawsuits have not required courts to address several substantive

issues that question the permissible scope of state claims for natural
resource damages.

71

In particular, courts have not determined whether

liability under CERCLA for natural resource damages extends to natural
resources that state or federal governments do not own, control, or manage
for the benefit of the public. 72 Additionally, courts have not had the
opportunity to determine whether the DOI's damage assessment regulations

violate CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions. Specifically, courts
have not determined whether the DOI's rule that requires government
trustees to select the lesser of the difference in the value of the natural
resource before and after the damages and the cost of restoring the
damaged resource as the measure of damages violates CERCLA's natural

68. See id. at § 11.91(c) (stating that government trustee must adhere to DOI damage
assessment regulations to obtain rebuttable presumption that trustee's damage assessment is
correct); supra notes 37-67 and accompanying text (discussing DOI's damage assessment
regulations).
69. See Habicht, supra note 16, at I (noting increase in number of CERCLA lawsuits
for damages to natural resources); Breen, CERCLA 's Natural Resource Damage Provisions:
What Do We Know So Far?, 14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,304, 10,304 n.2
(1984)(presenting list of cases that involve claims for natural resource damages under
CERCLA); Note, Theories of State Recovery, supra note 4, at 1103 (noting increase in
CERCLA claims for damages for injury to natural resources).
70. See, e.g., Idaho v. Howmet Turbine Component Co., 814 F.2d 1376, 1380 (9th
Cir. 1987)(holding that CERCLA does not require state to file 60-day notice of lawsuit if
state intends to sue responsible party for natural resource damages); United States v. Wade,
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20435, 20436 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1984)(holding that
CERCLA does not require state to formulate restoration plan before filing complaint for
natural resource damages); United States v. Reilly Tar and Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp.
1100, 1114 (D.Minn. 1982)(holding that CERCLA precludes liability for natural resource
damages only if all releases of hazardous substances and damages occurred prior to date
Congress enacted CERCLA).
71. See infra notes 72-73 and accompanying text (discussing substantive issues that
courts have not addressed under CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
72. See Breen, supra note 69, at 10306 (noting that issue of whether CERCLA requires
a connection between government regulation and damaged resource awaits judicial interpre-

tation); cf.

ANDERSON,

MANDELKER & TARLoCK, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND

PoLIcY 573 (1984)(questioning whether CERCLA prevents natural resource damage claims
for injury to natural resources on private property).
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resource damage provisions. 73 In resolving these substantive issues, courts
should recognize that Congress expanded the common-law public trust
doctrine in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions to create a
comprehensive federal cause of action that authorizes governments to act
on behalf of the environment and the public if releases of hazardous
substances injure or destroy natural resources. 74
A.

CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions: Expanding the
Public Trust Doctrine

1. The Public Trust Doctrine
The public trust doctrine recognizes that governments act as trustees

of certain natural resources and thus are responsible for preserving the
resources for the benefit of the public. 75 Early United States Supreme

Court decisions embraced the public trust doctrine by holding that state
governments hold title in tidelands and lands under navigable waters in
trust for the use and benefit of the public. 76 Although courts originally
invoked the public trust doctrine to protect the public's right to use water

resources for navigation, commerce, and fishing, courts have expanded
the doctrine to require governments to protect the public's interest in using

73. See Habicht, supra note 16, at 11 (noting that courts have not had opportunity to
implement DOI's damage assessment regulations). Prior to the promulgation of the DOI's
natural resource damage provisions, two federal district courts adopted conflicting interpretations of how to measure natural resource damages under CERCLA. In Idaho v. Bunker
Hill Co. the United States District Court for the District of Idaho determined that CERCLA
embraces traditional tort rules for calculating damages. Idaho v. Bunker Hill Co., 635 F.
Supp. 665, 667 (1986). Accordingly the court held that, under CERCLA, the appropriate
measure of damages to natural resources is the lesser of the difference in the resources'
value before and after the damages and the cost of restoring the damaged resources to their
original condition. Id. In contrast, in United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corporation,
the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota determined that, until the
DOI promulgates damage assessment regulations, criteria in section 301(c) of CERCLA and
existing case law on measuring natural resource damages govern damage assessments under
CERCLA. United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546 F. Supp. 1100, 1120 n.6
(D.Minn. 1982). Because section 301(c) of CERCLA and the case law cited by the Reilly
Tar court recognize that the cost of restoring damaged natural resources constitutes a proper
measure of damages to natural resources, the Reilly Tar court tacitly rejected the commonlaw rule for calculating damages. See id. (citing Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628
F.2d 652 (Ist Cir. 1980)); Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 674 (lst Cir.
1980) (refusing to limit damages to natural resources to market value of damaged resources).
74. See infra notes 90-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' recognition
and expansion of public trust doctrine in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
75. See Note, The Public Trust Doctrine: A New Approach to Environmental Preservation, 81 W. VA. L. REv. 455, 455 (1979) (discussing common-law public trust doctrine);
supra note 6 (same).
76. See Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 16 (1894)(holding that state holds tidelands in
trust for certain public purposes); Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,
452 (1892)(holding that state holds title to soils under navigable waters in trust for state's
citizens).
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water resources for recreational and ecological purposes. 77 Moreover, courts
have expanded the geographical reach of the public trust doctrine beyond
water resources to other natural resources, including public lands and
7
wildlife. 1
In addition to expanding the geographical reach of the public trust

doctrine and the variety of public uses that enjoy public trust protection,
courts have found that governments, as trustees of certain natural resources, have an affirmative duty to protect and preserve the resources
for the benefit of the public. 79 Moreover, some courts have determined

that the governments' duty to protect and preserve public trust resources
affords the governments a right to sue persons who damage natural

resources.8 0 For example, in In re Steuart Transportation Company' the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia considered

77. See Neptune City v. Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 309, 294 A.2d 47, 54-55
(1972)(expanding public trust doctrine to protect public's interest in recreational uses,
including bathing and swimming); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal. 3d. 251, 259, 98 Cal. Rptr.
790, 796, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (1971)(expanding public trust doctrine to include protection of
public in preserving tidelands in natural state for purposes of scientific study, open space,
and providing food and habitat for birds and marine life).
78. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (expanding public trust
doctrine to include protection of public lands); Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 522
(1896)(extending public trust doctrine to include protection of wildlife).
79. See Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 537 (1911) (holding that public trust
doctrine imposes duty on state governments to protect and preserve resources for public's
common heritage); National Audubon Society v. Superior Court of Alpine County, 189 Cal.
658 P.2d 709, 724 (1983)(public trust doctrine
Rptr. 346, -, 33 Cal. 3d. 419, -,
affirms duty of state to protect peoples' common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands,
and tidelands), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1984); In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495
F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D.Va. 1980)(holding that, under public trust doctrine, state government
has right and duty to protect and preserve public's interest in natural resources); see also
District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(noting that
courts have expanded public trust doctrine into source of positive state duties to protect
public's common heritage of natural resources). Since 1970, three different categories of
plaintiffs have brought claims under the public trust doctrine to protect natural resources:
1) private citizens suing the government for allegedly violating the doctrine; 2) private citizens
suing other private parties for allegedly violating the doctrine; and 3) governments suing
private parties for allegedly violating the doctrine. See Lazarus, supra note 6, at 645-646
(identifying three categories of public trust doctrine plaintiffs). In reviewing private citizen
claims against governments, courts generally have held that private citizens may maintain
actions against governments that fail to protect the public's interest in natural resources.
Id.
80. See Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp 1060, 1066 (D.Md. 1972)(holding
that state government, as trustee of water resources, has power to bring suit to protect
waters for benefit of public); State v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 125 N.J. Super.
97, -, 308 A.2d 671, 673-74 (N.J.L.Div. 1973)(holding that state having fiduciary duties
of trustee may bring suit to protect corpus of trust), rev'd on other grounds, 69 N.J. 102,
351 A.2d 337 (1976); In re Steuart Transportation Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D.Va.
1980)(holding that state government has right under public trust doctrine to recover damages
to waterfowl); infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text (discussing United States District
Court for Eastern District of Virginia's holding in In re Steuart Transportation).
81. 495 F. Supp. 38 (E.D.Va. 1980).
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whether the Commonwealth of Virginia had a right to sue an oil transport
company for the loss of migratory waterfowl after an oil spill. a2 In Steuart
the Steuart Transportation Company claimed that Virginia could not
maintain an action for damage to the migratory birds because Virginia
did not own the birds. 83 The Commonwealth of Virginia contended that

the right to recover for the loss of migratory birds did not depend upon
ownership, but upon the Commonwealth's sovereign right to protect the

public interest in preserving wildlife resources.8 4 Although the district court
agreed that Virginia did not own the migratory birds, the court determined

that the public trust doctrine supported Virginia's claim for damages to
the birds. 85 The Steuart court reasoned that, under the public trust doctrine,
the Commonwealth of Virginia had the right and duty to protect and
preserve the public's interest in natural wildlife resources.8 6 The district

court explained that the Commonwealth's right to bring suit did not derive
from ownership of the resources but from a duty that the Commonwealth
owes to the public.8 7 Accordingly, the district court denied Steuart's motion
for summary judgment.8 8 Thus, as Steuart illustrates, the judiciary has

expanded the common-law public trust doctrine from a primarily negative
restraint on a state's ability to alienate water resources to a source of

82. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 39 (E.D.Va. 1980). In Steuart the
Commonwealth of Virginia claimed that the Steuart Transportation Company was responsible
for an oil spill that killed approximately 30,000 migratory birds. Id. In addition to filing a
claim for damage to the migratory birds, Virginia filed claims for statutory penalties and
for the costs that Virginia incurred in cleaning up the oil spill. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.. In Steuart the Commonwealth of Virginia claimed that the right to protect
the public interest in preserving wildlife resources derives from the public trust doctrine and
the doctrine of parenspatriae.Id. The doctrine of parenspatriae, similar to the public trust
doctrine, recognizes a state's role as sovereign and as guardian of its people to protect the
interests of those citizens who legally are incapable of protecting their own interests. See
Note, Theories of State Recovery, supra note 4, at 1109 (discussing parenspatriaedoctrine).
To establish standing under the parenspatriae doctrine, the state must base its claim on the
protection of a quasi-sovereign interest. Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458
U.S. 592, 600-01 (1982). The Supreme Court has defined quasi-sovereign interests as a "set
of interests" that the state has in protecting the well-being of its citizens. Id. at 602.
Moreover, the Supreme Court has ruled that a state has a quasi-sovereign interest in
pollution-free air and water. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 238 (1907).
See generally Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environment: Parens Patriae Suits
for Damages, 6 CoLurm. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 411 (1970)(analyzing doctrine of parenspatriae
as source of environmental law).
85. In re Steuart Transp. Co., 495 F. Supp. 38, 40 (E.D.Va. 1980). In addition to
determining that the public trust doctrine supports Virginia's claim for damages to migratory
waterfowl, the district court in Steuart determined that the doctrine of parens patriae
provided separate support for Virginia's claim. Id.; see supra note 84 (defining doctrine of
parens patriae).
86. Steuart, 495 F. Supp. at 40.
87. Id.
88. Id.

1988]

NATURAL RESOURCE DAMAGE

1435

positive state duties to protect the public interest in preserving a variety
89
of natural resources.

2. CERCLA's Natural Resource Damage Provisions Recognize
the Public Trust Doctrine
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions recognize the powers
and duties that courts have imposed upon state governments under the
public trust doctrine. 90 Section 107(f) of CERCLA authorizes state governments to sue responsible parties who release hazardous substances that
damage natural resources. 9' By authorizing a state government to bring
natural resource damage claims on behalf of the public as trustee of
natural resources, section 107(f) implicitly recognizes a state government's
affirmative duty under the public trust doctrine to protect and preserve
natural resources for the benefit of the public. 92
Moreover, CERCLA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to structure CERCLA's natural resource provisions in accordance
with the public trust doctrine. 93 In reporting S. 1480 to the Senate floor,
the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works noted that the

89. See District of Columbia v. Air Florida, Inc., 750 F.2d 1077, 1083 (D.C. Cir.
1984)(noting that public trust doctrine has evolved into source of positive state duties to
preserve natural resources).
90. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of
1980, Pub. L. No. 96510, §§ 104(a)(4)(C), 107(0, 301(c), 94 Stat. 2767 (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9604(a)(4)(C), 9607(f), 9651(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(establishing and outlining
liability under CERCLA for damages to natural resource); supra notes 13-36 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions); see also Kenison,
Buchholz, & Mulligan, supra note 11, at 10,434 (noting that CERCLA recognizes state
trusteeship over natural resources); Menefee, Recovery for NaturalResource Damages Under
Superfund: The Role of the Rebuttable Presumption, 12 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.)
15057, 15058 (1982)(noting that role of government claimants in resource damage proceedings
under CERCLA is consistent with common-law public trust doctrine); supra notes 75-89
and accompanying text (discussing rights and duties that courts have imposed upon states
under public trust doctrine).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (establishing liability for natural
resource damages); supra notes 14-20 and accompanying text (discussing section 107(f) of
CERCLA).
92. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(f) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (requiring state governments to
act on behalf of public as trustee of natural resources that are damaged by releases of
hazardous substances); supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text (discussing § 107(f) of
CERCLA); see also Kenison, Buchholz & Mulligan, supra note 11, at 10,435 (noting that
CERCLA recognizes state governments' underlying interest as public trustee in natural
resources); Habicht, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that § 107(0) of CERCLA requires state
government to bring natural resource damage claims as trustee of public interest in injured
natural resource); supra notes 79-89 and accompanying text (discussing courts' expansion of
public trust doctrine to include affirmative duty to protect public's interest in preserving
natural resources).
93. See infra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's legislative
history pertaining to public trust doctrine); supra note I (discussing general legislative history
of CERCLA).
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serious problem of injury to natural resources from releases of hazardous
substances required states, as trustees of natural resources, to recover
damages for the injuries. 94 Accordingly, the Senate committee declared
that S. 1480 creates liability for natural resource damages to preserve the
public trust in natural resources. 9s Similarly, in reporting on H.R. 85, the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries explained that the

bill's natural resource damage provisions authorize a state to recover for
damages to natural resources that the state holds in trust for the benefit
of the public. 96 Thus CERCLA's legislative history and statutory language
indicate that Congress, in enacting CERCLA's natural resource damage
provisions, implicitly recognized a state government's right and duty under
the public trust doctrine to protect and preserve natural resources for the
97
benefit of the public.
3.

CERCLA Expands the State Government's Role as Trustee of
Natural Resources

CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions merely do not codify
the rights and duties that courts have imposed on state governments under
the public trust doctrine. 98 Instead, CERCLA's statutory language and

legislative history indicate that Congress intended to expand and strengthen
a state government's role as trustee of natural resources.19 By extending

the geographical reach of the public trust doctrine and by adopting a
comprehensive measure of natural resource damages, CERCLA's natural
resource damages provisions establish a powerful federal cause of action
that authorizes a state government to act on behalf of the environment

94. See S. REP. No. 848, supra note 1, at 84 (discussing S. 1480's natural resource
damage provisions); S. 1480 § 4(b), 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), 126 CONG. REc. S14,940
(daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980)(establishing liability for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources that result from release of hazardous substances); see also supra note 1 (discussing
legislative history of CERCLA).
95. See S. Rm,. No. 848, supra note 1, at 84 (discussing legislature's intent in enacting
S. 1480); see also supra note I (discussing legislative history of CERCLA).
96. See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong, 2d Sess. 401, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 6119, 6185 (noting that H.R. 85 authorizes states to recover damages
to natural resources that state holds in trust for benefit of state's citizens); H.R. 85 §
103(a)(3), 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979), 126 CONG. REc. H9,190 (daily ed. Sept, 19,
1980)(establishing liability for natural resource damages that result from oil spills). See
generally Grad, supra note 1, at 3-4 (discussing H.R. 85, Oil Pollution Liability and
Compensation Act).
97. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's recognition
of public trust doctrine); see also supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text (discussing
courts' expansion of public trust doctrine).
98. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text (discussing courts' expansion of
public trust doctrine); infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress'
expansion of public trust doctrine in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
99. See infra notes 98-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' expansion of
public trust doctrine in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
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and the public if a release of hazardous substances injures natural resources. 100
a.

CERCLA Expands the Geographical Reach of the

Public Trust Doctrine
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions build upon the judiciary's expansion of the public trust doctrine's geographical reach.' 01 The
judiciary has expanded the public trust doctrine in a piecemeal fashion to
require state governments to protect the public interest in a limited variety
of natural resources. 0 2 In defining the term "natural resources," however,
CERCLA greatly expands the geographical reach of the public trust
doctrine to address damage to wildlife, fish, biota, air, land, groundwater,
and drinking water supplies. 0 3 Thus, by adopting a broad definition of
natural resources, CERCLA extends a state government's trustee obligations beyond the protection of navigable waters, tidelands, wildlife, and
public lands to all natural resources within the state's territory. 1' 4

100. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' expansion of
public trust doctrine's geographical reach in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions);
infra notes 105-127 and accompanying text (discussing comprehensive measure of natural
resource damages that Congress established in CERCLA's natural resource damages provisions).
101. See infra notes 102-104 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' expansion of
public trust doctrine's geographical reach in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions);
supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text (discussing courts' expansion of public trust
doctrine's geographical reach).
102. See supra notes 77-89 and accompanying text (discussing courts' expansion of
public trust doctrine's geographical reach); see also Lazarus, supra note 6, at 647 (noting
that judicial viewpoints have proliferated remarkably on meaning of public trust doctrine
and on what constitutes governmental or private activity inconsistent with trust restrictions);
Kenison, Buchholz & Mulligan, supra note 11, at 10436 (noting that judiciary has developed
common-law public trust doctrine differently in each state); Note, Defining the Appropriate
Scope of Superfund Natural Resource Damage Claims: How Great an Expansion of Liability?, 5 VA. J. NAT. REsouRcEs L. 197, 201 n.39 (1985)(noting that judiciary has expanded
public trust doctrine in piecemeal fashion).
103. See 42 U.S.C § 9601(16) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(defining term "natural resources"
as used under CERCLA); supra note 22 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's
broad definition of term "natural resources").
104. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text (discussing natural resources that
enjoy protection under common-law public trust doctrine); see also Kenison, Buchholz &
Mulligan, supra note 11, at 10436 (contending that CERCLA extends public trusteeship
obligations to all natural resources within state); Special Project, Developments - Toxic
Waste Litigation, 99 HAgv. L. REv. 1458, 1567 (1986)(noting that Congress intended
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions to reach all resources within government's
jurisdiction); Note, supra note 4, at 1104 n.24 (noting that CERCLA does not require state
to own damaged natural resource to file claim for natural resource damages). But see
Warren & Jackrison, supra note 15, at 20 (contending that CERCLA's natural resource
damage provisions require special nexus between government and damaged natural resource);
Breen, supra note 69, at 10,305-06 (same).
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CERCLA Establishes a Comprehensive Measure of
Damages to Natural Resources

CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions enhance a state government's ability to protect and preserve all natural resources within the
state's territory by establishing a comprehensive measure of damages that
deviates from the common-law rule for measuring damages. 05 The common-law rule for measuring damages to real property authorizes a plaintiff
to recover the lesser of the difference in the commercial or market value
of the property before and after the damage and the cost of restoring the
damaged property to its original condition. 0 6 Courts have not agreed
whether this common-law damage rule governs a state government's claim
under the public trust doctrine to recover damages for injuries to the
state's natural resources. 10 7 CERCLA's statutory language and legislative
history, however, indicate that Congress did not intend the common-law
damage rule to govern a state government's claim under CERCLA to
recover damages for injuries to natural resources resulting from releases
of hazardous substances. 08
Although CERCLA fails to provide concise guidelines for measuring
natural resource damages, the language of CERCLA's natural resource
damage provisions indicate that Congress did not intend to adopt the
common-law damage rule that limits damages to the lesser of restoration

105. See infra notes 106-127 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's comprehensive measure of damages to natural resources).
106. See Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 672-73 (1st Cir. 1980)(noting
common-law rule for measuring damages to real property); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 929(1)(a) (1979)(stating common-law rule for measuring damages to real property);
Special Project, supra note 104, at 1569 (noting that common-law approach to measuring
damages to natural resources authorizes plaintiffs to recover lesser of restoration cost and
lost value).
107. Compare Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power &
Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, -,
308 A.2d 671, 674 (1973)(refusing to speculate on
monetary value of environmental damages and awarding damages in accordance with market
value of fish killed), rev'd on other grounds, 69 N.J. 102, 351 A.2d 337 (1976) with Puerto
Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 674 (Ist Cir. 1980)(refusing to limit damages to
Commonwealth's natural resources to market value of damaged resource). Reflecting the
judiciary's disagreement over whether the common-law damage rule governs a state claim
under the public trust doctrine, commentators dispute whether CERCLA's natural resource
damage provisions adopt the common-law damage rule. Compare Warren & Zackrison,
supra note 15, at 49 (arguing that CERCLA adopts common-law damage rule that requires
plaintiffs to recover lesser of restoration costs and lost value) with Breen, supra note 69, at
10307 (arguing that CERCLA authorizes state governments to recover at least full cost of
restoring damaged natural resources); see also infra notes 109-127 and accompanyingtext
(contending that CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions establish comprehensive
measure of damages that deviates from common-law damage rule).
108. See infra notes 109-127 and accompanying text (arguing that CERCLA's natural
resource damage provisions establish comprehensive measure of natural resource damages
that deviates from common-law damage rule).
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cost and lost use value. 0 9 Section 107(f) of CERCLA contains two provisions that manifest Congress' intent to authorize a state government to
recover at least the cost of restoring damaged natural resources. "10 First,
section 107(f) provides that the measure of natural resource damages is
not limited the to cost of restoring or replacing the damaged resources."'
Second, section 107(f) requires state governments to use natural resource
damage awards to restore, replace, or acquire the equivalent of the
damaged natural resources.112 Congress' emphasis on restoration and replacement costs in these statutory provisions indicate that Congress intended to establish the cost of restoring damaged natural resources as the
minimal floor of damages under CERCLA.1 3 Moreover, by prohibiting
government trustees from agreeing not to sue a responsible party for
natural resource damages unless the party agrees to protect and restore
the damaged resources, CERCLA's natural resource settlement provision
indicates that Congress intended to authorize trustees to recover the costs
of restoring damaged natural resources. 1 14 Accordingly, CERCLA's statutory language indicates that Congress intended to deviate from the
common-law damage rule by authorizing government trustees to recover
the costs of restoring a damaged natural resource even if the restoration
5
costs exceed the value of the lost natural resource services."
The legislative history of Congress' reauthorization of CERCLA in
1986 further indicates that CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions
establish a comprehensive measure of damages that deviates from the
common-law damage rule." 6 Commenting on H.R. 2817, the House Coin-

109. See infra notes 110-115 and accompanying text (discussing statutory language of
CERCLA that rejects common-law damage rule); supra note 106 and accompanying text
(discussing common-law damage rule).
110. 42 U.S.C § 9607(0 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); seesupranotes 16-20 and accompanying
text (discussing § 107(0 of CERCLA); infra notes 11-127 and accompanying text (discussing
CERCLA's intent to authorize state governments to recover at least cost of restoring damaged
natural resources).
111. See 42 U.S.C § 9607(0 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(stating that measure of natural
resource damages "shall not be limited by the sums which are used to restore or replace
such resources").
112. Id.
113. See Breen, supra note 69, at 10307 (arguing that language in § 107(f) of CERCLA
indicates that Congress intended to guarantee government trustees cost of restoring damaged
natural resources).
114. See Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99499, § 122 (j)(2), 100 Stat. 1615 (codified at 42 U.S.C § 96220)(2)) (1982 & Supp. IV
1986))(governing settlements of natural resource damage claims); supra notes 32-36 and
accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's natural resource settlement provision). Although
section 122(j)(2) of CERCLA pertains to federal governments trustee responsibilities in
settling natural resource damage claims, the section's emphasis on restoration nonetheless
illustrates Congress' intent to restore injured natural resources.
115. See supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text (analyzing statutory language of
CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
116. See The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub.
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mittee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries declared that the primary purpose
of CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions is to restore or replace
damaged natural resources.1 7 The House Committee noted that section
107(f) of CERCLA establishes two categories of natural resource damages?18 The House Committee explained that CERCLA authorizes state
governments to recover both the cost of restoring the damaged natural
resources and the value of the lost public uses of the damaged resources." 9
If the total amount of damages exceeds the costs needed to restore the
injured resources, the House Committee maintained that the trustee should
20
use the excess funds to acquire the equivalent of the damaged resources.
Thus, in light of the House Committee's comments, CERCLA's natural
resource damage provisions deviate from the common-law damage rule by
authorizing state governments to recover both, as opposed to the lesser
of, the cost of restoring injured resources and the value of the lost resource
2
services.1 '
Moreover, in commenting on Congress' reauthorization of CERCLA's
natural resource damage provisions, both House and Senate leaders agreed
that CERCLA establishes a comprehensive measure of damages that deviates from the common-law damage rule. 22 The Chairman of the House
Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries declared that the cost of
restoring damaged natural resources constitutes the basic measure of
damages under CERCLA. 23 The Chairman further noted that CERCLA
authorizes government trustees to recover the value of lost uses between
the release of hazardous substances and the completion of the restoration
project. 24 The Chairman stressed, however, that the primary purpose of
CERCLA's natural resource damages provisions is to make whole the
natural resources that suffer injury from releases of hazardous subst-

L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1615 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C §§ 9601-9657 (1982
& Supp. IV 1986)); infra notes 117-127 and accompanying text (discussing SARA's legislative
history).
117. H.R. REP. No. 253, pt. 4, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. at 50, reprinted in 1986 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3068, 3080.
118. See H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 117, at 50 (explaining measure of damages
under CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions); 42 U.S.C § 9607(0 (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986)(outlining liability for natural resource damages).
119. H.R. REP. No. 253, pt. 4, supra note 117, at 50. The Senate Committee explained
that a trustee may recover the value of lost public and private uses of damaged resources
from the time of the release of hazardous substances to the time the trustee restores the
damaged resource to its original condition. Id.
120. Id.
121. See supra notes 117-120 and accompanying text (discussing House Committee
comments on CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
122. See infra notes 123-127 and accompanying text (discussing House and Senate
leader's comments on CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
123. See 131 CONG. REc. H9613 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986)(statements of Rep.
Jones)(commenting on CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
124. Id.
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ances.'2 Similarly, the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Environment

and Public Works agreed that the cost of restoring damaged natural
126
resources constitutes the minimum measure of damages under CERCLA.
Accordingly, CERCLA's statutory language and legislative history indicate
that CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions expand the public

trust doctrine by establishing a powerful federal cause of action that
authorizes state governments to protect and preserve natural resources and
to compensate the public for its losses when a release of hazardous
substances injures a natural resource that is located within the state's
territory.

B.

27

The DOI Regulations Contravene Congress' Intent to Establish
a Comprehensive Federal Cause of Action for Damages to
Natural Resources

The DOI regulations adopt a narrow approach to measuring natural
resource damages that contravenes Congress' intent in enacting CERCLA
to establish a comprehensive measure of natural resource damages and to
restore natural resources that suffer injuries from releases of hazardous
substances. 2 In enacting CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions,
Congress intended to establish a comprehensive measure of damages that
deviates from the common-law damage rule. 29 The DOI's damage assessment regulations, however, adopt the common-law damage rule by limiting
a state government's damage recovery to the lesser of the cost of restoring
damaged resources and the value of lost public uses of the resources. 30
Thus, by adopting the common-law damage rule, the DOI regulations
explicitly contravene Congress' intent to establish a comprehensive measure
of natural resource damages that authorizes state governments to recover

125. See id. (commenting on CERCLA's natural resource damage provision that requires
government trustees to use damage awards only to restore damaged natural resources).
126. See 132 CONG,. REc. S14,930-31 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986)(colloquy of Sen. Baucus
and Sen. Stafford, Chairman of Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works). In
discussing CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions, the Chairman of the Senate
Committee on Environment and Public Works maintained that it is unreasonable to construe
CERCLA as requiring government trustees to recover the lesser of natural resource restoration costs and the value of lost natural resource services. Id.
127. See supra notes 105-126 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's comprehensive measure of damages to natural resources).
128. See supra notes 37-65 and accompanying text (discussing DOI damage assessment
regulations); supra notes 116-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in
enacting CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
129. See supra notes 116-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in
enacting CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
130. See supra notes 46, 59-65 and accompanying text (discussing DOI regulations that
require government trustees to select lesser of restoration cost and lost use value as measure
of natural resource damages under CERCLA); see also Special Project, supra note 104, at
1569 (noting that DOI damage assessment regulations adopt common-law approach of taking
lesser of restoration cost and lost value).
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restoration costs and the value of lost public uses if releases of hazardous
substances injure the state's natural resources.

In addition to contravening Congress' intent to establish a comprehensive measure of natural resource damages, the DOI's damage assess-

ment regulations contravene Congress' intent to restore natural resources
that suffer injuries from releases of hazardous substances.' 3' In establishing
a comprehensive measure of natural resource damages, Congress' foremost
intent was to restore injured natural resources, regardless of the resources'
value to the public.

32

The DOI's damage assessment regulations, however,

authorize state trustees to recover the cost of restoring injured natural
resources only if restoration costs are less than the value of the lost public

uses of the injured resources.

33

In most instances of injury to natural

resources, the cost of restoring the natural resources to their original

condition exceeds the value of lost public uses of natural resources.

34

In

practice, therefore, the DOI damage assessment regulations will inhibit

state governments from recovering sufficient funds to restore damaged
natural resources. 35 Accordingly, by limiting a state government's natural
resource damage recovery to the lesser of the cost of restoring natural
resources and lost use value, the DOI damage assessment regulations

contravene Congress' intent to establish a comprehensive measure of
natural resource damages and to restore natural resources that suffer
1 36
injuries from releases of hazardous substances.
By contravening Congress' intent to establish a comprehensive measure

of damages and to restore natural resources, the DOI damage assessment
regulations reject CERCLA's recognition that natural resources have a
value independent of their value to society. 37 The difference between
131. See supra notes 105-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent, in
enacting CERCLA, to restore injured natural resources).
132. See supra notes 110-115, 117, 123, 126 and accompanying text (noting that Congress
intended restoration costs as minimum measure of damages under CERCLA's natural
resource damage provisions).
133. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987)(requiring government trustees to recover lesser
of restoration cost and diminution of public use value); see also notes 37-68 and accompanying text (discussing DOI's damage assessment regulations).
134. See Breen, supra note 69, at 10307 (noting that cost of restoring injured natural
resources often yields value much higher than lost public use value); see also City of
Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg. Co., 61 F.2d 210, 213 (8th Cir. 1932)(refusing to
award cost of repairing damage to stream due to pollution because decrease in rental value
attributed to polluted stream is substantially less than cost of restoring stream), rev'd on
other grounds, 289 U.S. 334 (1933); Ewell v. Petro Processors of Louisiana, Inc., 364 So.
2d 604, 609 (Ct. App. La. 1978)(refusing to award cost restoring wetland because cost
greatly exceeded market value of wetland).
135. See 132 CONG. Rc. S14929 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 1986) (statements of Sen. Baucus)(noting that DOI's requirement to select lesser of restoration costs and lost use value
will result in far less resource restoration than Congress intended).
136. See supra notes 128-135 and accompanying text (criticizing DOI's damage assessment regulations).
137. See infra notes 144-148 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's view that
natural resources have value independent of resources' value to society).
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CERCLA's and the DOI's measures of natural resource damages illustrates
two competing views of society's relationship to the environment. 13 The
traditional view, implicit in the DOI regulations' adoption of the commonlaw damage rule, maintains that a natural resource's true value is the
value of the services that the natural resource provides to society (DOI
view). 139 Under the DOI view, natural resources exist primarily for human
use and consumption and, consequently, when a party damages a natural
resource, society is the injured party. 140 Accordingly, the DOI view provides
that a party who damages a natural resource adequately compensates
society for the damage by paying the value of the services that the resource
had provided to society.' 41 Moreover, to achieve a cost effective allocation
of social resburces, the DOI view does not require a party injuring a
natural resource to pay the cost of restoring damaged natural resources
unless the restoration cost is less than the lost use value of the natural
resource.' 42 In review, by valuing natural resources in terms of the resources' value to society, the DOI's view of society's relationship to the
environment fails to provide state governments with sufficient funds to
restore natural resources that have important ecological value but little
143
social value.
In contrast, a second view of society's relationship to the environment,
implicit in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions, does not limit
the value of natural resources to the resources' use value to society
(CERCLA view).' 44 By providing that the cost of restoring injured natural

138. See infra notes 139-148 and accompanying text (discussing two competing views
of society's relationship with environment).
139. See Yang, Valuing Natural Resource Damages: Economics for CERCLA Lawyers,
14 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10311, 10313 (1984) (stating that value of resource is
value of services that resource provides to users of resource).
140. See G. MILLER, LiNG IN TME ENVMONMENT 453 (1985) (observing that under
traditional human-centered view of nature, humans are source of all value and that nature
exists only for human use); Note, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni:
State Actions for Damage to Non-Commercial Living Natural Resources, 9 B.C. ENVTL.
AnF. L. REv. 397, 429 (1980)(stating that, if defendant damages state's natural resources,
people of state are injured party).
141. See 43 C.F.R. § 11.35(b)(2) (1987)(requiring government trustees to recover lesser
of restoration costs and lost use value); Yang, supra note 139, at 10312 (stating that proper
measure of natural resource damages is based on value of direct flow of services from
resources to public).
142. See Note, supra note 102, at 220 (stating that, if cost of restoring natural resource
is higher than aggregate value of all services society receives from resource, charging
defendant for restoration cost is misallocation of social resources).
143. See A. LEoPoLD, A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC 214 (1966)(noting that system of
environmental conservation based on economics tends to ignore, and eventually to eliminate,
natural objects that lack commercial value but are essential to health of environment).
144. See Katz, Searchingfor Intrinsic Value: Pragmatism and Despairin Environmental
Ethics, 9 ENVTL. ETrmcs 231, 233 (1987)(noting that non-human-centered view of environment
recognizes that exclusive human-center goals do not justify environmental policies); infra
notes 145-149 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's view of society's relationship
with nature).

1444

WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:1417

resources constitutes the minimum measure of damages under CERCLA,
and by requiring state governments to use damage awards to restore the

environment, Congress implicitly recognized that natural resources have a
value independent of any use value to society.' 45 Thus, if a party damages

a natural resource, the CERCLA view recognizes that the environment is
an injured party. 46 The CERCLA view consequently requires a party who
damages a natural resource to compensate the environment by paying the

cost of restoring the injured resource, regardless of the resource's use
value to society.' 47 In review, by recognizing that natural resources have

a value independent of the resources' value to society, the CERCLA view
of society's relationship to the environment ensures that state governments
will recover sufficient funds to restore damaged natural resources that

145. See supra notes 105-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to
establish comprehensive measure of natural resource damages); see also Stone, Should Tress
Have Standing? Toward Legal Rights for Natural Objects, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 450, 450-458
(1972)(explaining view that natural objects have intrinsic value).
146. See Varner, Do Species Have Standing?, 9 ENvTL. ETHIcs 57, 61 (1987)(discussing
view that natural objects have rights and that damages to natural objects, rather than to
society, triggers operation of law). By recognizing that natural resources suffer legally
cognizable injuries when releases of hazardous substances damages natural resources, CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions embrace one commentator's suggestion that the
law should regard natural objects as holders of legal rights. See Stone, supra note 145, at
456 (proposing to give legal rights to natural objects in environment); see also Sierra Club
v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 741-42 (1971)(Douglas, J., dissenting)(contending that contemporary concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to conferral of
standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation). The commentator
observed that under common law, natural objects do not have legal rights because 1) natural
objects lack standing to sue on their own behalf, 2) the merits of cases involving injury to
natural objects do not include damages to the objects themselves, and 3) natural objects are
not the beneficiaries of damage awards. Stone, supra note 145, at 459-64. CERCLA's natural
resource damage provisions arguably provide natural resources with legal rights. See supra
notes 13-36 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions). Under CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions, state governments may recover
the cost of making a damaged resource whole, taking into account damages to the resources
themselves. See supra notes 110-115, 117, 123, 126 and accompanying text (noting that
Congress intended to establish cost of restoring environment as minimum measure of damages
under CERCLA); see also Stone, supra note 145, at 480-81 (suggesting that courts require
party who injures natural object to pay cost of restoring object to its original condition).
Moreover, CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions require state governments to use
damage awards to restore the environment, rendering the environment the direct statutory
beneficiary of CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C § 9607(0 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)(requiring government trustees to use natural resource damage awards to restore damaged natural resources).
Thus, under CERCLA, natural resources arguably attain legal rights and state governments,
in bringing natural resource damage claims, act as guardians of the natural resources' rights.
See supra notes 17-20 and accompanying text (discussing state government's role, as under
CERCLA, as public trustee of natural resources).
147. See Stone, supra note 145, at 475 (suggesting that court should require party who
injures natural objects to pay cost of making the environment whole); supra notes 110-127
and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent in CERCLA to require parties who
damage natural resources pay cost of restoring resource to its original condition).
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have important ecological value but little use value to society. 148
IV.

CONCLUSION

In enacting CERCLA Congress established liability for damages to
natural resources resulting from releases of hazardous substances. 49 Congress expanded the common-law public trust doctrine in CERCLA's natural
resource damage provisions to establish a broad federal cause of action
that allows state governments to restore the environment and to compensate
the public for its losses when releases of hazardous substances damage
natural resources. 5 0 By adopting the common-law damage rule, the DOI's
natural resource damage assessment regulations contravene Congress' intent to establish a comprehensive measure of natural resource damages
and to ensure complete restoration of damaged natural resources.' 5' The
DOI's failure to follow Congress' intent is unfortunate because Congress,
through CERCLA, has expressed a willingness to incorporate an environmental ethic in federal law. 52 This ethic recognizes that the environment
has a value independent of its value to society and thus condemns actions
that destroy the integrity and stability of the environment. 5 As environmental problems worsen, the need for society to adopt a new ecologically
responsible ethic becomes imperative. Adopting Congress' recognition, in
CERCLA, that natural resources have inherent value would be a prudent
54
and innovative step toward solving our nation's environmental problems.
By striking the DOI's adoption of the common-law damage rule as
arbitrary or capricious or otherwise not in accordance with the law, the
D.C. Circuit would preserve Congress' intent to restore natural resources
that suffer damages from releases of hazardous substances. 55 More importantly, the D.C. Circuit would lend judicial support to an innovative

148. See supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' intent to
adopt comprehensive measure of damages in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
149. 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(c) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986); supra notes 13-36 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's natural resource damages provisions).
150. See supra notes 98-127 and accompanying text (discussing Congress' expansion of
public trust doctrine in CERCLA's natural resource damage provisions).
151. See supra notes 37-68 and accompanying text (discussing DOI's damage assessment
regulations); supranotes 128-136 and accompanying text (discussing DOI's contravention of
Congress's intent in enacting CERCLA's natural resource damages provisions).
152. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA's non-humancentered view of man's relationship to environment).
153. Id.; see also A. LEOPOLD, supra note 143, at 224-25 (declaring need for new land
ethic that holds that actions are right if they tend to preserve integrity, stability, and beauty
of biotic community).
154. See supra notes 144-148 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA view of
society's relationship to environment).
155. See supra note 12 (discussing standard of judicial review under APA for challenges
to federal agency decisions and actions); supra notes 110-127 and accompanying text
(discussing Congress' intent to adopt comprehensive measure of damages in CERCLA's
natural resource damage provisions).
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approach to protecting the environment which recognizes that the environment, and not just society, suffers legal injuries when hazardous
15 6
substances damage natural resources.
DAVID A. McKAY

156. See supra notes 144-48 and accompanying text (discussing CERCLA view of
society's relationship to environment).

